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Beyond the Battered Woman Syndrome:
An Argument for the Development of
New Standards and the Incorporation of
a Feminine Approach to Ethics
by DeborahKochan*

In the past twelve years, feminist legal scholars and attorneys
increasingly have mounted challenges to the law of self-defense.
Beginning in 1977 with State v. Wanrow,' attempts have been made
to modify the law of self defense to accommodate women's
experiences. What has become known as women's self-defense work'
is now an established part of both feminist litigation and legal
literature. The courts most frequently have addressed issues of
women's self-defense in the context of battered women charged with
killing men who battered them.
Although modifications to the law of self-defense have focused
on accommodating the experiences of battered women who kill their
abusers, these modifications have produced very few real gains in
reflecting the needs and realities of battered women who kill. This
comes as no surprise when one considers that the law continues to
see women as men see women, because it is men who have shaped,
defined, and interpreted the law. Professor Catharine MacKinnon
has observed that one of our problems in using law as a tool for
social change is that invoking law usually means having to fit a
woman's complaint, or understanding of an interaction or of an

BA (Psychology) 1985, University of California at Berkeley. J.D. 1990, Hastings College
of the Law.
1. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).

2. The term .'women's self-defense work' has been used to describe legal work on issues
of sex bias in the law of self-defense and criminal defenses generally. The term was first used

as the name of a project jointly sponsored by the Center for Constitutional Rights and the
National Jury Project.
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injury, into existing legal definitions. 3 These legal definitions,
however, rarely have been crafted with women's experience in mind,
and they often do not match women's experiences of harms.
Moreover, the principles and presumptions underlying these legal
definitions often are overlooked. These principles and presumptions,
created by and for men to reflect their experiences, continue to
work against women, even when existing legal definitions are
expanded. Thus, the need to go beyond simply expanding existing
statutory or common law definitions has emerged from women's selfdefense work, as well as from the areas of sexual harassment,
equality in the workplace, rape, and pornography. Professor Lucinda
Finley aptly characterizes this need to go beyond simply expanding
statutory and common law definitions as an "urgent project."
We must 'start to grapple with the nature of law itself, to
understand the extent to which it is male defined, and the extent
to which its language and its process of reasoning are built on
male conceptions of problems and of harms--and on male, or
epistemologically "objective" and "neutral," methods of analysis..
. .We must challenge standards of credibility that often make
women's accounts suspect because they do not comport with a
conventional wisdom that was based on the invisibility of women's
experience and we must question the inclusiveness of the stance
of legal reasoning... which privileges abstract analogic reasoning
over experiential understandings .... 4
The extent to which those charged with implementing and
applying the law continue to rely on existing underlying principles
will be reflected in the degree to which the law continues to fail
initially to protect women from harm, and to give women a fair trial
when they must resort to self-help.
This Comment will discuss, in general terms, ways in which the
law of self-defense fails to accommodate the experiences of women.
This is not to say that the law fails all women in the same way, or

3. MacKinnon, Feminim, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward an Agenda for Theory,
INCULTURE AND Soc'Y 515 (1982); and MacKinnon, Feminism,Marxism,
Method andthe State: Toward a FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS: . WOMEN IN CULTURE AND
Soc'Y 635 (1983).

7 SIGNs: J.WOMEN

4. Finley, Book Review, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 352, 384-85 (1988)(reviewing C.
(1987)).

FEMINISM UNMODIFIED

MACKINNON,
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to the same degree. Nor does the law treat all men of all races and
classes equally. Indeed, "[o]ur legal system rests on an ethnocentric,
androcentric, racist, Christian, and class-based vision of reality and
human nature, all of which makes it inherently flawed." s Practically
speaking, of course, these factors are intertwined, but for the
purposes of this Comment, I will focus on the inherently sex-biased
nature of the law.
Although I am limiting my examination of the law of self-defense
to a discussion of its androcentric nature,'the task of challenging the
underlying principles and presumptions in the law of self-defense
remains overwhelming. Not only must the law of self-defense be
scrutinized, but all of the systems and influences that create and
perpetuate the law also must be questioned. That men have
controlled and defined knowledge is evidenced by the fact that their
point of view is defined as "objective truth," and is at the heart of
the legal system's failure to adequately protect women and to
adequately represent women when women are forced to protect
themselves. That even notions of moral reasoning and ethics have
been formulated from a male perspective leaves one wondering
where we should begin in our attempt to discover who women "are,"
much less how the law can truly and accurately reflect women's
experiences.
This Comment evaluates the success of attempts to extend the
existing law of self-defense to reflect women's experiences. I will
argue that the law, as conceived and applied within the framework
of an ethic of principles, 6 limits our ability to treat women fairly and
humanely in situations where a woman would feel compelled to
defend herself with deadly force. In Part I, I discuss the traditional
law of self-defense as derived from an ethic of principles. This ethic
of principles is contrasted with an alternative view, a feminine
approach to ethics--an ethic of caring. In Part II, I discuss attempts

5. Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tor; 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 3, 10
(1988). Professor Leslie Bender notes that the priorities and needs of women from various
racial, cultural, and economic environments differ, even though we all feel the oppression of

patriarchy. Although it is not enough for the law simply to recognize and accommodate
broad distinguishing factors such as gender, that it has barely begun to accomplish even this

is indicative of the inability of the law to accommodate factors such as race, culture and class.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 8-16.
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to expand statutory and common law definitions of the law of selfdefense through the use of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome. In Part III, I discuss the limitations of this approach and
its ultimate failure, which result from conceptualization and
application within the framework of an ethic of principles. In Part
IV, I discuss the need for a reconceptualization of the law of selfdefense. This reconceptualization, including the development and
incorporation of a feminine approach to ethics, is necessary in order
to counter the inherently male bias of the law--a law founded on an
ethic of principles.

I
Traditional Law of Self-Defense as Founded on an Ethic

of Principles
As lay persons, many of us have the notion that law is the
vehicle through which justice is achieved. Although we understand
that the law, by its mere existence, cannot guarantee that nothing
"wrong" or "bad" will happen, we believe that at least to some
extent, the law can "right" a "wrong" after the "wrong" has occurred.
As a law student (if not before) one learns just how naive this
perspective is. We read case after case, whether in criminal law,
contracts, civil procedure, family law, or constitutional law, that
illustrates that even supposedly correct application of the law can
result in outcomes that are counter intuitive, unjust, and sometimes
downright unconscionable. This is confusing particularly because the
law, with all of its attendant moral reasoning and underlying
presumptions, invariably is presented as "objective truth."7 When one
understands that the law is built upon and sustained by an "ethic of
principles," it becomes clear how the law can be so grossly
inadequate as a vehicle for dispensing justice.

7. The term "objective as it is used in the law is inherently misleading and confusing. By
definition, the term is synonymous with unbiased, open-minded, and neutral. The law is full
of so-called objective standards-standards created by and for men to reflect their

experiences. By presenting these standards as objective (which is also, by the way,
synonymous with the male-identified qualities "detached," "rational," and "reasonable") we

create and perpetuate a framework in which an abstract principle is frequently more
"relevant" than so-called subjective factors that describe the concrete situation at issue.
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In her groundbreaking book,8 Professor Nel Noddings explores
a view of ethics that begins with the moral attitude of longing for
goodness, not with moral reasoning. She contrasts an "ethic of
principles," which starts from the presumption that the basis of
moral action is an altruism acquired by the application of rigid rules
and principles, with an "ethic of caring," which starts from the
presumption that the basis of moral action is caring and the memory
of being cared for.
Ethics, the philosophical study of morality, has concentrated for
the most part on moral reasoning.... (E)thical argumentation has
frequently proceeded as if it were governed by the logical necessity
characteristic of geometry. It has concentrated on the
establishment of principles and that which can be logically derived
from them. One might say that ethics has been discussed largely
in the language of the father; in principles and propositions, in
terms such as justification, fairness, justice.9
An ethic of principles places principles (i.e., you can only kill if
"necessary" to save your life, which is the exception to another
principle: thou shalt not kill) above any set of subjective facts that
corresponds to real people and real situations. Moral behavior is
defined according to whether or not the principle has been violated,
and if violated, whether the violation comes within another principle
that circumscribes the exception.
A presumption also exists that moral principles are, by their very
nature as moral principles, universifiable. Those whose circumstances
are "different" are profoundly disadvantaged by this presumption. As
Professor Noddings notes:
...
the principle of universifiability seems to depend, as Nietzsche
pointed out, on a concept of "sameness." In order to accept the
principle, we should have to establish that human predicaments
exhibit sufficient sameness, and this we cannot do without
abstracting away from concrete situations those qualities that seem
to reveal the sameness. In doing this, we often lose the very
qualities or factors that gave rise to the moral question in the
situation. That condition which makes the situation different and
thereby induces genuine moral puzzlement cannot be satisfied by
8. N. NODDINGS, CARING, A FEMeiwNN APPROACH TO ETmcs & MoRAL EDUCATION (1984).
9. M, at 1.
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the application of principles developed in situations of sameness. 10
Thus, that which makes you or your circumstances different is
excluded so that by definid'on your behavior is classified as immoral
and in violation of the law. The only way to be moral and lawful
under the existing system is to behave as much as possible like those
who made the standards and rules--men.
Professor Noddings contrasts the existing approach to moral
reasoning--an ethic of principles--with a feminine approach to ethics-an ethic of caring. She argues that the feminine approach perceives
human caring, and the memory of caring and being cared for, as the
foundation of ethical response. According to Noddings ethical caring
arises out of
natural caring--that relation in which we respond as
"one-caring11' out of love or natural inclination. She identifies the
relation of natural caring as the human condition that we,
consciously or unconsciously, perceive as "good."
It is that condition toward which we long and strive, and it is our
longing for caring--to be in that special relation--that provides the
motivation for us to be moral. We want to be moral in order to
remain in the caring relation and to enhance the ideal of ourselves
as one-caring.12
Noddings describes her work as "an essay in practical ethics from
the feminine view'."u3
This does not imply that all women will accept it or that men will
reject it; indeed, there is no reason why men should not embrace
it. It is feminine in the deep classical sense--rooted in receptivity,
relatedness, and responsiveness. It does not imply either that logic
is to be discarded or that logic is alien to women. It represents an
alternative to present views, one that begins with the moral
attitude or longing for goodness and not with moral reasoning. 14

10. Id- at 85.
11. Professor Noddings, in order to establish a firm conceptual foundation free of
equivocation, uses "one-caring" and "cared-for" to identify the two parties of the relation. For
the purposes of her work, relation is taken as ontologically basic and the caring relation as
ethically basic. "Relation" is thought of as a set of ordered pairs generated by some rule that

describes the affect-or subjective experience--of the members.
12. N. NODDINGS, supra note 8, at 5.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id at 2.
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Professor Noddings posits that women, in particular, approach moral
problems by placing themselves in concrete situations and assuming
personal responsibility for the choices to be made. They define
themselves in terms of caring and work their way through moral
problems from the position of "one-caring."
Professor Noddings distinguishes an ethic of principles from an
ethic of caring in that an ethic of caring does not embody a set of
universal moral judgments. She notes that morality typically has been
explored through the consideration of moral judgments.
The long-standing emphasis on the study of moral judgments has
led to a serious imbalance in moral discussion. In particular, it is
well known that many woman--perhaps most women--do not
approach moral problems as problems of principle, reasoning, and
judgment. If a substantial segment of humankind approaches moral
problems through a consideration of the concrete elements of
situations and a regard for themselves as caring, then perhaps an
attempt should be made to enlighten the study of morality in this
alternative mode.' 5
Indeed, I will argue that an attempt should be made to enlighten
the legal system in this alternative mode as well. As will be explored
in more detail in Part IV, the law of self-defense, enlightened in this
alternative mode, would proceed from a subjective approach. Instead
of proceeding deductively from principles superimposed on situations,
we would seek to gather as many facts as possible about the
situation and about the individuals involved in a move toward
concretization.
Professor Noddings asserts that an important difference between
an ethic of caring and other ethics is its foundation in relation. 16
The recognition of and longing for relatedness forms the foundation
of the ethic of caring. This distinction is especially interesting when
examined in the context of the conditions under which women kill.
Although, as compared to men, women rarely kill, 17 it is significant
that when women do kill, they frequently kill men whom they knew

15. Id at 28.
16. Id.at 6.
17. Only 13% of those arrested for homicide in 1984 were women. FED. BuREAU OF
INVESTIGATON, U.S.

DEPar oF JusncE, UNiE.*CRiME REPoRTS 179

(1984).
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well, often husbands or lovers.18 As victims, men almost always are
killed by other men, and as compared to homicides by females,
victim and offender are often strangers to each other.19 It has been
said that female homicide is so different from male homicide that
women and men may be said to live in two different cultures,20 each
with its own "subculture of violence."21 If this is true then it should
come as no surprise that laws created to address male homicide, and
applied within the framework of an ethic of principles, do not
adequately address circumstances under which women kill. The
implications for women of a legal system founded exclusively on an
ethic of principles--an ethic not founded in relation--will be explored
more fully in Part III. First, however, we need to understand how
the traditional law of self-defense, with its explicit elements and
implicit presumptions, is founded on, and serves to reinforce, an
ethic of principles.
The law of homicide, as founded on an ethic of principles, has
as its overriding principle that it is wrong (immoral) to kill. But as
with all principles, there are exceptions, the conditions under which
we can violate the principle and still, supposedly, 2 be moral. The law
of self-defense, as an exception to the principle that it is immoral to
kill, defines the conditions under which killing would be moral.
"(N)ecessity is the pervasive theme of the well-defined conditions.
* the law imposes on the right to kill or maim in self-defense.""3

18. Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and
Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1679, 1681 n.10 (1986)(authored by Laurie J.
Taylor).

19. Id. at 1680 n.4.
20. MacKinnon, Feminim, Marxism, Metho4 and the State: Toward FeministJuisprudence,
8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE AND Soc'Y 173, 186 (1983).
21. See M. WOLFGANG & F. FPRRAcun, THE SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE: TOwARDs AN
140, 158 (1967) (concluding on the basis of analyses
of homicidal behavior that there exists a "subculture of violence" with an "existing complex
of norms, values, attitudes, material traits" and "interlocking value elements shared with the
dominant culture").
22. Coming from the perspective of an ethic of caring, we reject the notion that our
morality, guilt, or righteousness hinges on whether or not we conform to, or fall within the
exception to, a particular principle. The absurdity of hinging something like guilt or morality
on whether or not we conform to a principle is revealed when we realize that much of the
fighting and killing going on in the world today is often done in the name of principle.
23. S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 721
INTEGRATED THEORY IN CRIMINOLOGY
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The traditional formulation of a claim of self-defense is: (1) there
must have been a threat, actual or apparent, of the use of deadly
force against the defender; (2) the threat must have been unlawful
and immediate; (3) the defender must have believed that he was in
imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm; and (4) that his
response was necessary to save himself 4
The elements of self-defense define the boundaries of necessity.
Although this definition of necessity is presumed to be universal and
has invariably been presented as if it were objective truth, in reality
necessity has been contemplated from a strictly male point of view.
The traditional elements of self-defense are based on the paradigm
of an encounter between twd men of roughly equal physical size and
ability. The traditional model anticipates a one-time attack/defense.
The defendant is threatened with an attack that could potentially
result in serious bodily harm or death and therefore is justified in
protecting himself. This model presumes that the authorities will step
in at the first possible opportunity;21 therefore, the defendant only
need defend himself as far as is necessary, at that moment, to keep
the aggressor at bay.
This model, as will be explored in more detail in Part Il, does
not accommodate a scenario that includes repeated attacks over
time (battering), nor does it need to because men are not, in
significant numbers, subjected to repeated and vicious physical abuse
during the course of their everyday lives. This definition of
"necessity" 6 does not contemplate having to live in an environment
dominated by regular, vicious, physical abuse without the possibility
of intervention or recourse to the law.27 Since necessity does not

(4th ed. 1983).
24. See W. LAFAVE &

A Sco'rr, HANDBOOK ON CIMINAL LAW §

53, at 391 (1972).

25. This is never explicit; however, implicit in every law is its enforcement. When you
defend yourself against an unlawful threat, therefore, it is presumed that the authorities will
step in to stop the aggressor.
26. The term "necessity," as used throughout this Comment will refer to the traditional
male-conceived notion of self-defense.
27. Much has been written about the failure of the police and courts to intervene in
domestic disputes. See D. MARTIN, BATiERD WivEs 87-118 (1976); Eisenberg, An Overview
ofLegal Remedies for BatteredWomen-PartI, ThIAL, Aug. 1979, at 28; Eisenberg & Micklow,
The Assaulted Wife: "Catch-22"Revisitea 3 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 138, 159 (1977); Fields,
RepresentingBatteredWives or What to Do Until the PoliceArrive, 3 FAM. L RE'. 4025, 4027-
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contemplate living with such physical abuse, the possibility of a
fundamental right to a life free from abuse never enters into the
equation that balances the rights of the attacker against the rights
of a woman to preserve her physical integrity.
What if after repeated efforts by yourself and others to stop
the abuse, your husband continues to inflict regular, vicious
beatings? Might you have some ethical obligation to yourself (and
to your children) to preserve yourself as one-caring? The argument
that one has a fundamental right to a life free from abuse includes
moral and ethical issues that the time-honored notion of necessity,
as perceived from a male perspective within a framework of an ethic
of principles, never confronts. ,
Recognizing the sharp contrast between masculine and feminine
approaches to ethics, we must ask how society can continue to hold
women accountable to an ethic which does not reflect women's
approach to moral reasoning. Moreover, how can we logically and
rationally hinge violation of the principle on a definition of necessity
that does not take into account the realities of women's lives and
the circumstances that force women to defend themselves?

U
Expansion of the Law of Self-Defense Through Expert

Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome
Women have been disadvantaged severely in their attempts to
gain acquittal on the grounds of self-defense because a woman's
reasonable response to physical violence is likely to be different
from a man's because of her size, strength, and lack of social and
economic power. Even more problematic is the fact that the
traditionally male-conceived notion of necessity does not include the
kind of circumstances that women face in the context of a battering
relationship. Women are subjected to qualitatively and quantitatively
different types of violence than the traditional self-defense model

28 (1977); Truninger, Mwitial Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L. 259, 262
(1971); Woods, Litigation of Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WoMEN's RTs. L REP. 7, 9-11
(1978); Wife Beaters:Few of Them EverAppearBefore a Court of Law N.Y. Times, Oct. 21,
1974, § 2, at 38.
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anticipates. It is, therefore, not surprising when their reasonable
response does not always fall neatly within the circumscribed
boundaries of the existing model. That a woman could kill under
circumstances outside traditional elements of self-defense, and still
be acting morally, is never a possibility under the law as founded on
an ethic of principles.
Historically, the standard for determining whether the defendant
used a reasonable amount of force and whether the defendant
reasonably believed that he was in immediate danger was that of the
"reasonable man." Beginning in 1977 with State v. Wanrow,2
women's self-defense work has developed the perspective that
traditional self-defense requirements of reasonableness, imminent
danger and equal force are sex-biased. In Wanrow, the defendant,
Yvonne Wanrow, was convicted of second-degree murder for
shooting a man she knew to be a child molester when he came up
behind her after approaching the.child of a friend. The trial court
instructed the jury to consider only the events immediately
preceeding the killing. Additionally, the jury instructions used the
male pronoun "he," creating the impression that "the standard to be
applied was that applicable to an altercation between two men. 29
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and the Washington
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the traditional self-defense
standard completely failed to take into account the perspective of
women. The court held that Wanrow, who was five-feet-four-inches
tall and on crutches at .the time of the shooting, was not to be
judged as if she were on roughly equal footing with her six-feet-twoinch tall, intoxicated male adversary, whose violent and molesting
behavior she knew about before the shooting.
Although the Wanrow case represented a step forward in
recognizing the sex-biased nature of the elements of self-defense,
standing alone it did little to counter the long held views of women
as inherently unreasonable, 30or to counter myths and misconceptions

28. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).

29. 88 Wash. 2d at 240, 559 P.2d at 558.
30. See Comment, supra note 18, at 1690-91. In 1873, a unanimous American court found
that the common-law reasonableness standard would not apply to a twenty-year-old female
tort defendant:
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concerning battered women.
Research on battered woman syndrome emerged from an effort
to counteract myths and misconceptions that women initiated,
provoked, and enjoyed the violence (i.e., why did she stay in the
relationship if it was really so bad; why didn't the woman just
leave?). 31 Expert testimony on batteged woman syndrome was
developed to explain the common experiences of, and the effect of
repeated abuse on, battered women.
Dr. Lenore Walker, the leading researcher in this field, identified
a three-stage cycle of violence: a tension-building stage characterized
by discrete abusive events; an acute battering stage characterized by
uncontrollable explosions of brutal violence by the batterer; and a
loving respite stage characterized.by calm and loving behavior and
pleas for forgiveness. 2 Battered woman syndrome includes a
description of the psychological impact of the common social and
economic problems that battered women face. These problems
include: failure of the police and the courts to protect women from

(T)he incompetency indicated by her age and sex-without evidence (of which there
was none) of any unusual skill or experience on her part-was less in degree, it is
true, than in the case of a mere child; but the difference is in degree only, and not
in principle.
Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32, 42 (1873). As recently as 1981, one writer wondered "as to
what law might be involved in the law of the reasonable woman, we follow precedent and
venture no opinion ... leaving open the question of whether conjoining 'reasonable' and
'woman' creates a contradiction in terms." Weber, Some Provoking Aspects of Voluntary
ManslaughterLaw, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 159, 175 n.15 (1981).
31. There are commentators that question the existence of these myths because of what
they characterize as a lack of empirical research. See Acker & Toch, Battered Women. Straw
Men, and Expert Testimony: A Comment on State v. Kelly, 21 CriM. L. BuLL- 125, 139 (1985);
and Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and EmpiricalDissen
72 VA. L. REv. 619, 629 n.46 (1986)(authored by David Faigman). I find it persuasive,
however, that in case after case the prosecutor takes advantage of these myths in an (often
successful) attempt to discredit the defendant. Long before battered woman syndrome was
conceived of, prosecutorial strategy revolved around the "failure" of the woman to leave the
battering relationship. Generally speaking, neither the prosecution nor the defense asks a
question or brings up an issue that is potentially damaging to their side unless they believe
it will do more good than harm. That the prosecution consistently "risks" the potential
damage and raises this issue, and even specifically asserts that the defendent could have left
or must have liked the abuse, is indicative that the myths do exist in the minds of the judge
and juror.
32. L. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN 55-70 (1979).
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abuse;33 that battered women may not be able to leave their mates
because they may have no job,34 child care, adequate housing'or
community social services; 35 that battered women suffer severe
isolation and shame which strengthens their belief that they have no
safe alternative;3 and that the lack of alternatives and the cycle of
battering in which the men promise to reform leads women to cling
37
to the illusion that the men will change.
The purpose of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
was to educate the judge and jury about the common experiences
of battered women, and to explain the context in which an
individual battered woman acted, so as to lend credibility to her
explanation of her actions, At its best, expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome has served to counteract stereotypes of battered
women as solely responsible for Ihe violence. At its worst, expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome has been presented, heard,
and misheard as depicting battered women as helpless victims, which
fails to describe the complexity and reasonableness of why battered
women act. 8
From the beginning the phrase "battered woman syndrome" was
intended to simply describe common psychological and social
characteristics of battered women. That it has been heard to
communicate an implicit but powerful view that battered women
are all the same, that they are suffering from a psychological
disability, and that this disability prevents them from acting

33. See supra note 27.
34. Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma. To Kill or to beKilled, 32 HASTINGS LJ. 895, 901
(1981); Robinson, Defense Strategiesfor Battered Women Who Assault Their Mates: State v.
Curry, 4 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 161, 166 (1981); Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women:
Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defens, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REy. 623, 626 (1980); Note, The
Use of Expert Testimony in the Defense of Battered Women, 52 U. CoLo. L REv. 587, 588
(1981); Note, The Expert as Educator:A ProposedApproach to the Use of Battered Woman
Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 VAND. L REV. 741, 743 (1982).
35. See supra note 34.
36. Eber, supra note 34, at 901; Robinson, supra note 34, at 165-66, 173; Schneider, supra
note 34, at 626; Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror'sKen: Battered Women, 7 VT.
L REv. 1, 11 (1982); Note, 35 VArD. L REv., supra note 34, at 743, n.13.
37. L WAumc, supra note 32, at 532.
38. Schneider, Describingand Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of
Expert Testimony on Battering 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 195, 199 (1986).
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"normally," is reflective not of the work itself, but of the
intransigent, unchallenged, underlying presumptions in the law. As
Professor Elizabeth Schneider notes:
:.. (t)he question which the expert testimony cases squarely pose
is this: if battered women's experiences are explained as different,
can they ever be genuinely incorporated into the traditional
standard and understood as equally reasonable? Are these
different experiences inevitably perceived as inferior, as
"handicaps?" If so, is it necessary to alter the traditional
39
standard?
The short answer to that question is yes! As will be explored in
more detail in Part III, expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome fails to integrate women's experiences into the law of selfdefense because it never really challenges the underlying model of
moral reasoning, with its attendant presumptions upon which the
elements of self-defense are based. Although the Wanrow holding
and the admissibility of expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome represents a shift toward a more subjective standard, the
basic elements of self-defense, as conceived of within the framework
of an ethic of principles, continue to work against women forced to
defend themselves in situations not contemplated by the traditional
law.

The Failure of Expert Testimony on Battered Woman
Syndrome as a Function of Application Within an Ethic
. of Principles
In theory, expert testimony on battering is the logical extension
of the trend, beginning with Wanrow, to overcome sex-bias in the
law of self-defense and to equalize treatment of women in the
courts. In fact, however, the expert testimony cases "pose troubling
questions about the degree to which these goals have been
realized.u0 Although women's self-defense work has resulted in the

39. I

at 214.

40. Id.at 197.
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acknowledgment of the different circumstances under which women
kill, these different circumstances and experiences must still be
accommodated within the same standard of self-defense.
The law of self-defense as founded on an ethic of principles fails
to accommodate a feminine approach to moral reasoning. As such,
the law ignores the possibility that a woman might be forced to kill
in order to maintain herself as one-caring, even though the
requirement of imminent danger has not been met.
The traditional underlying ethic dictates that killing another is
morally wrong except in cases of extreme necessity as circumscribed
by the elements of the self-defense doctrine. An ethic of principles, by
its construction, does not allow for truly subjective evaluations. The
principle comes first and subjectivity is allowed only to the extent
that it fits within the principle.
The traditional self-defense scenario requires us to choose
whether the killing of the attacker or the killing of the defendant
is more morally acceptable in a situation where one of the two must
die. The defendant's actions will be considered ethical, and hence
justifiable self-defense, only if the elements of self-defense are
strictly adhered to. The presumption of a one-time attack/defense
with intervention by the authorities at the first possible opportunity
results in a principle that never addresses the issue the typical
battered woman confronts. Indeed, the traditional elements of selfdefense do not make sense and cannot be applied fairly to a
situation that does not involve a one-time attack/defense and
intervention by the authorities.
The traditional law of self defense does not address situations
in which a woman has suffered repeated, regular, vicious beatings,
over a substantial period of time, without recourse to the law. Our
defendant may have been burned, cut up, kicked in the stomach and
suffered miscarriage, received broken jaws, legs, and arms, and be
bruised so badly and so repeatedly that she never completely heals.
She may have called the police on many occasions and then have
had to convince them that she really wanted her attacker to be
arrested, and then finally gotten a temporary restraining order
(TRO) only to have it not enforced. She may have moved again and
again only to have her attacker follow her and continue his abuse.
Yet the principle of self-defense maintains that unless he was
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threatening her with death or something very near it at the time she
killed, she was not justified in her action.
What if somehow our defendant knows that her abuser will
catch up with her again next week and that this time he will "only"
break her jaw and cause her to need fifteen stitches in her face?
And what if she also knew that there was no escaping this man and
that the only way to avoid further abuse was to kill him? Isn't this
necessity?
When our defendant kills, her ethical ideal is diminished, of
course, because she is no longer behaving as one-caring. Even
though she is acting for the purpose of maintaining the quality of
the ethical ideal for herself and other remaining cared-fors (i.e., her
children), her action is not without its effects on herself, the onecaring. 41 Her ethical ideal begins to diminish the moment she begins
to withdraw from her husband. When caring must consciously
exclude particular persons "the ideal is diminished, that is,
quantitatively reduced."4' Morally,
(s)he must meet the other as one-caring until he is, intentionally,
a positive threat to her physical or ethical self. If the one no
longer cared-for violates her withdrawl, increases his threat, and
persists in his malicious approach, she is justified in acting to
prevent further abuse. Acting to prevent further abuse is, of
course, guided by the ethic of caring. 43

41. This observation brings up another thought-provoking distinction between an ethic of
principles and an ethic of caring. Within the law as founded on an ethic of principles,
behavior which is exculpatory is divided into two categories; justified behavior and excused
behavior. Justified behavior focuses on the act in that it deems that the act itself was "right"
because the circumstances were so compelling as to invalidate the normal rules of criminal
conduct. Excused behavior, on the other hand, focuses on the actor. The act is deemed
"wrong" or harmful to society, however, the actor's behavior is excused due to internal or
external pressures which render her morally not blameworthy. Under an ethic of caring, the
distinction between justification and excuse is blurred. We focus on the actor (the defendant)
to the extent that we recognize that she has acted against her ethical ideal (which sounds like
excuse). We examine our defendant's act, however, keeping in mind the compelling nature
of the circumstances and her need to kill in order to maintain herself as one-caring (which
sounds like justification). Professor MacKinnon has noted that "feminism tends to collapse
the distinction [between justification and excuse] by telescoping the universal and the
individual into the mediate, group-defined, social dimension of gender." MacKinnon, Book
Review, 34 STAN. L. REV. 703, 717 n.73 (1982).

42. N.

NODDINGS,

supra note 8, at 114.

43. N.

NODDINGS,

supra note 8, at 115 (emphasis added).
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A feminine view of ethics recognizes that our defendant, in
order to act morally, does not have to refuse to kill out of blind
obedience to principle. She might have to kill, and although this is
admittedly under the guidance of a sadly diminished ethical ideal,
the test of ultimate blame or blamelessness lies in how the ethical
ideal was diminished. Did she choose the degraded vision out of
greed, cruelty, or personal interest? Or was she driven to it by
unscrupulous others44 who made the ethical ideal impossible to
sustain? 45
A feminine view of ethics recognizes that "right" and "wrong"
differ with the situation. That is not to say that this feminine view
of ethics is a form of situational ethics in which the emphasis is on
the consequences of our acts. The consequences of our acts are not,
of course, irrelevant. A feminine view of ethics, however, perceives
morality as located primarily in the pre-act consciousness of the
defendant. 4 With respect to the battered woman who kills, central
to our inquiry are her attempts to continue to meet her attacker as
one-caring. Did she try to enlist lawful relief for her suffering? As
noted above we would want to know whether she chose to kill, and
degrade her ethical ideal, out of greed, cruelty, or personal interest,
or whether she was driven to it by unscrupulous others who made
the ethical ideal impossible to sustain. 47
The Wanrow court took a step forward in recognizing that the
"reasonable man" standard was overtly sexist. Converting the
"reasonable man" to a "reasonable person" or even "reasonable
woman" did not exorcise the sexism, however, but instead embedded
it.4 The Wanrow court did go beyond simply substituting the neutral
word "person" for "man" by also recognizing that the standard failed
to account for a woman's relative size, strength, and experience.
This resolution of the standard's sexism, however, failed to recognize
or counter the underlying ethic and presumptions of the law of self-

44. This includes, obviously, the batterer as well as those who had the power and
authority to intervene but failed to do so.
45. See N. NODDINGS, supra note 8, at 102.
46. See N. NODDINGS, supra note 8, at 28.
47. See supra note 45.
48. See Bender, supra note 5, at 22.
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defense.
The explicit limitation of the Wanrow holding is indicative of the
court's reluctance to challenge the underlying presumptions in the
law of self-defense. In Wanrow, the court limited its holding by
refusing to hold that the trial court abused its discretion by not
allowing an expert witness to testify about the effects of Wanrow's
Native American culture on her perceptions and actions. The
Washington Supreme Court held that a female defendant might be
entitled to a self-defense instruction that included her gender as a
subjective factor, but defendants of particular races or classes could
not receive similar "special" instructions. Gender is an allowable
subjective factor, however, only to the extent that it serves to
conform women's experiences to those of men so that the same
standard can be applied. Subjective factors are not allowed for the
purpose of showing and explaining how the traditional elements
cannot be fairly applied, which is what testimony concerning the
effects of Wanrow's Native American culture would have
accomplished. Thus, although the term "reasonable man" has been
replaced by "reasonable person" or "reasonable woman," the maleconceived notion of necessity is still the controlling factor. The
modem "reasonable person" or even "reasonable women" standard
simply serves to mask a profoundly gender-based and race-specific
standard.
Within the law, in a substantive way, men are the measure of
all things. Women are measured according to their correspondence
or lack of correspondence with men. As explored in more detail
below, the attempt to gain maternity benefits for women reveals the
implicit male norm. Men do not get pregnant (an experience
fundamental to the female experience), therefore, maternity benefits
have traditionally not been part of the employment benefits package
for men. Women, therefore, are also not entitled to maternity
benefits. The male perspective is viewed as objective truth. This
framework perpetuates the problem that an "equal recognition of
difference is termed the special benefit rule or special protection
rule legally, the double standard philosophically."49

49. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 33 (1987).
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Wanrow would have us apply an "objective" standard to men
from all backgrounds, while allowing women to benefit from a more
"subjective" standard. This reinforces the notion that women are less
reasonable when they act in -self-defense. We give women the
"benefit" of a more "subjective" standard and thus supposedly
remove their "handicaps."s Yet we retain the male-conceived notion
of necessity and traditional elements of self-defense, against which
we continue to measure women. This contributes to theperception
that the subjective standard is another example of a special benefit
or special protection, or just a plain double standard.
Given a case where the traditional elements of self-defense
could be applied fairly (i.e., the circumstances were of the type
contemplated by the traditional self-defense scenario), we still are
confronted with the possibility of conflicting definitions within the
elements of self-defense. For example, who gets to define "harm?"
We may accept the notion that the defendant's history of abuse
should be admitted only to the extent that it appears "relevant" to
the reasonableness of the defendant's perception of imminent
"harm" at the time of the killing, 51 but who gets to define "relevant?"
We will never come close to achieving ' justice" if we continue to
rely on definitions that do not include women's perceptions of harm
and relevance. This problem is vividly illustrated by the following
comments:
Often the reaction of the battered wife is delayed and occurs at
an uncommonly serene moment. At other times--as in the case
analyzed here--the prior beatings are offered to explain the wife's
perception of the husband's seemingly innocuous (or certainly non52
life threatening) behavior as creating imminent danger.

50. The term "handicaps" was used by the Washington Supreme Court to describe the
effect of sex discrimination. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240, 559 P.2d 548, 559
(1977). Professor Elizabeth Schneider notes that: "the court's use of the word.., played on
the stereotype of victimized and mistreated women that has historically limited women's
claims for equal treatment and suggested that the court's responsiveness to Yvonne Wanrow's
claim was shaped by patriarchal solicitude." See Schneider supra note 38, at 214.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55.
52. Acker & Toch, supra note 31, at 125.
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The case that the authors are referring to is State v. Kelly.53 The
"seemingly innocuous" or "certainly non-life threatening" behavior
to which the authors are referring consists of the husband charging
toward the defendant with his hands raised, just minutes after
choking her by pushing his fingers against her throat, punching and
hitting her in the face, and biting her leg. The defendant, Ms. Kelly,
stated that after two men from a crowd that had gathered stopped
her husband from beating her, she went looking for her daughter,
whom she feared had been pushed around in the crowd. After
finding her daughter, Ms. Kelly observed Mr. Kelly running toward
her with his hands raised. Unsure,of whether he had armed himself
while she was looking for their daughter, and thinking that he had
come back to kill her (Mr. Kelly had beaten Mrs. Kelly almost
weekly throughout their marriage and had often threatened to kill
her and cut off parts of her body if she ever left him), she grabbed
a pair of scissors from her pocket book to scare him away, and
ended up stabbing him instead.
The above commentators' perspective illustrates the need to
challenge the abstract notion that defending oneself against
imminent harm is justifiable, but that being charged at by someone
who has repeatedly beaten you, and just minutes before had choked
you to the point that you almost passed out, is "seemingly
innocuous" or "certainly non-life threatening behavior."
At least one commentator, while recognizing that "(t)he unique
circumstances surrounding battering relationships require a flexible
and perhaps unique application of the elements of the self-defense
claim," is concerned that the "four elements of self-defense should
not be stretched into oblivion.5 14 In order to prevent the extinction
of the traditional elements, the woman's history of abuse is to be
admitted only in "those cases where it appears relevant to the
reasonableness of her perception of imminent harm at the time of
the killing."55 This suggestion fails to recognize the issues raised by
the imminence requirement when applied to the battering context.
If the woman is' faced with the choice of either being subjected to

53. 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
54. Note, supra note 31, at 646.
55. Id.

1989]

FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS

a future of regular, vicious abuse or killing her tormentor, she might
respond morally (although under a sadly diminished ethical ideal) by
killing even when not threatened with imminent death. Under an
ethic of caring, testimony as to the history of abuse and failure of
the authorities to stop the abuse would be relevant to show that she
made every effort to meet the other as one-caring. If her ethical
ideal (i.e., ability to maintain herself as one-caring) was being
diminished under the continual abuse she suffered, acting to prevent
further abuse is guided by the ethic of caring.
Although there. has been a move toward a more subjective
standard of reasonableness, the ethic and presumptions underlying
the subjective standard have not been challenged. The subjective
standard admits factors such as a woman's relative size, strength,
and lack of training in defending herself. It also allows testimony as
to the history of abuse to the extent that this shows the
reasonableness of the woman's fear that she is faced with imminent
death or serious bodily harm. These subjective factors are allowed,
however, only to the extent that they are relevant to the traditional
elements of self-defense.
The attempt to accommodate women's experiences in the law
of self-defense through admissibility of expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome suffers from the same fatal flaw as did the
attempt to gain maternity leave benefits for women in the
workplace. Since the male experience or perspective is presented
as the norm or objective truth, women get what men have to the
extent that we are like them. However, women are different! We
can bear children! Since men do not get pregnant, maternity leave
was not built into the system. Since women only get what men get,
women do not get the benefit of maternity leave. Asking for it now
is treated as if we were asking for something special or extra.
Similarly, since men are not subjected to battering during the
course of their everyday lives, the law does not have standards that
contemplate the-need for self-defense in this context. Women get
the benefit of self-defense only to the extent that our actions
conform to the traditional model. If women act to prevent future
pain and suffering. (even after exhausting other options) but cannot
claim and prove that they reasonably believed their lives to be in
imminent danger, they simply cannot claim self-defense. Asking that
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the law recognize the "need" to kill in self-defense without strict
adherence to the male-defined notion of necessity is treated as if we
were asking for a special standard or rule.
Attempts have been made to accommodate women with respect
to maternity leave by treating pregnancy as an illness or a disability.
Treating pregnancy as a disability or an illness not only obscures the
needs of a pregnant woman that disability or illness benefits do not
accommodate, it also, not surprisingly, contributes to the problem of
women being devalued in the workplace. Furthermore, it ignores the
underlying problem, which is the validity of a principle that places
profits before people.
Similarly, attempts to accommodate women's experiences into
the law of self-defense have revolved around ultimately requiring
women to fit into the same old definition of necessity. This works
to delegitimatize or obscure the real circumstances under which
women act--circumstances which take them out of the realm of the
male-defined concept of necessity.
The expert testimony cases are the natural result of the
"differences" approach in that the goal of the expert testimony is
to explain the context of battered women's different experiences
and perceptions so that juries can fairly apply the same legal
standards to them. What we are doing in these cases is, once again,
only allowing women to claim reasonableness to the extent that their
experiences are analogous to men's experiences. The battered
woman syndrome has been applied in such a way that it serves to
repackage women's experiences so that they more closely comport
with those of men. In so doing, these different experiences inevitably
are perceived as inferior or as "handicaps. 56 Moreover, the very
factors that make the situation different and help to explain the
reasonableness of the woman's act are lost.
The time-honored notion of necessity incorporates the
requirement of a "fair fight." Thus, commentators and courts often
get bogged down in applying the law of self-defense to a situation
where a woman kills her battering spouse at a time other than
during the course of a beating, when he is characterized as
"defenseless." The law of self-defense does not contemplate the need

56. See supra note 50.
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to defend oneself within a battering relationship, in which the
woman's situation, for all practical purposes, resembles that of a
prisoner of war. We don't require that the prisoner of war confront
his jailor, head on. We can see clearly the bars that keep the
prisoner locked up and we know better than to hope for some
outside force to intervene on behalf of the prisoner. The prisoner
must use whatever tactics are available, even those that in other
circumstances might seem unfair, in order to have a chance to
escape.
Although this is admittedly an extreme example, I maintain that
it is fundamentally analogous to the experience of many women in
battering relationships, and hence goes much further towards
elucidating the reasonableness of their actions. Despite the fact that
there are usually no bars keeping a woman imprisoned in the
battering relationship (although there are certainly numerous cases
where during the course of the battering relationship the woman
was at some time, if not frequently, tied up, locked up, or both), a
woman's lack of economic and emotional support often renders her
7
so isolated and powerless that she is effectively behind bars.
Allowing the consideration of subjective factors, such as women's
relative size, strength, and history of abuse, presumably works by
putting women and men on "equal footing" with respect to the law
of self-defense. The law can then, supposedly, protect and
accommodate them both equally. What this approach fails to
confront, however, is that the ethic underlying the law of selfdefense serves to reinforce the male perspective of reality while
ignoring the reality of women.

57. See supra notes 34, 36.
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IV
Towards the Development of New Standards and
Definitions and the Incorporation of a Feminine
Approach to Ethics
I can already hear the protests, "but how can you say that you
are claiming self-defense for these women, after all, you are
rejecting the application of the elements of self-defense." To this
protest, I owe my new found response to Professor Noddings.1 My
response goes something like this: Ah, yes. But, after after all, I am
a woman, and I was not party to that definition.
Then there will be those who, recognizing that the system is far
from perfect, still refuse to reject the traditional elements of selfdefense for fear of ending up on the "slippery slope." They take
comfort in the "bright lines" and the clear-cut categories that the
traditional approach affords.
All I know for sure is that the system is not working. Women,
in significant numbers, are subjected to repeated, vicious abuse by
their husbands and "lovers." The system fails to help women
maintain themselves as one-caring and then, when finally some of
them act under the guidance of a sadly diminished ethical ideal, the
system fails them again by holding them accountable to a definition
of necessity which does not contemplate circumstances within the
battering context.
How would we define self-defense if we approached it from the
perspective of an ethic of caring? What factors would we use as
guidelines to determine whether a woman acted morally, in selfdefense, although under an admittedly diminished ethical capacity?
How would we distinguish killings that were motivated by cruelty,
personal interest, or retributive impulses?
As we have already discovered, women, in general, enter the
domain of moral action through a different door than men.
It is not the case, certainly, that women cannot arrange principles
hierarchically and derive conclusions logically. It is more likely that
we see this process as peripheral to, or even alien to, many

58. N. NODDINGS, supra note 8, at 95.
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problems of moral action. Faced with a hypothetical moral
dilemma, women often ask for more information. We want to
know more, I think, in order to form a picture more nearly
resembling real moral situations. Ideally, we need to talk to the
participants, to see their eyes and facial expressions, to receive
what they are feeling. Moral decisions are, after all, made in real
situations; they are qualitatively different from the solution of
geometry problems. Women can and do give reasons for their acts,
but the reasons often point to feelings, needs, impressions, and a
sense of personal ideal rather than to universal principles and
their application.5 9
This suggests that we would want to take into account as many
factors surrounding the act as possible. We would want to consider,
as a factor, whether the woman was significantly disadvantaged as
a result of a lack of economic and political power. We would want
to know if the woman sought help, and if not, why not. We would
want to know if she had good reason to believe that if she did not
succeed in killing her abuser she would be subjected to additional
(and because of her attempt to fight back), more vicious attacks.
After consideration of all of these factors, we might determine that
the killing was simply an act of preservation of the woman's physical
and ethical self. The imminence factor is no longer central to our
inquiry because we acknowledge the possibility of the "necessity" of
killing as motivated by the need to maintain oneself as one-caring.
We would want to recognize that the system does not protect all
people "inall situations equally. Women's experiences are far
removed from the self-defense scenario which presumes that the
authorities will "step in," thereby limiting the necessity for self-help.
Women collectively experience a sense of learned helplessness in
that we traditionally -have been unable to assert control over our
environment within the framework of the law.. Women's everyday
experiences reinforce the'reality of our lack of power: we have no
recourse from constant sexual harassment from strangers on the
street; we face a high incidence of rape with a corresponding low
conviction rate of rapists; we are sexually harassed in the workplace
as well, and although the law has very recently addressed this, the
problem is far from resolved. All of this is in addition to the very
59. N. NODDINGS, supra note 8, at 96.
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specific problems that many battered women experience in trying to
use the law to stop their batterers: unresponsiveness of police;
inability to get TROs; inability to have those TROs enforced once
they are obtained; and the ultimate ineffectiveness of a TRO with
respect to the behavior of the abuser. The battered woman often
comes to the conclusion that she alone has to protect herself. She
learns, from her everyday experiences as a woman, and her specific
experiences as a battered woman, that the law provides her with no
real recourse nor with any measure of control. For all practical
purposes women's reality corresponds more closely to the conditions
faced by prisoners of war than with the conditions contemplated in
the traditional self-defense scenario.
I am not advocating that we reject the ideal that it is immoral
to kill. Indeed, an ethic of caring recognizes that "when one
intentionally rejects the impulse to care and deliberately turns her
6
back on the ethical, she is evil, and this evil cannot be redeemed." 0
What I am saying is that in determining whether or not one is guilty
of a crime and whether or not one has acted ethically, the
traditional elements are simply factors to guide us. As factors, and
not rigid requirements, they will not always be central to our inquiry.
It is the relationship that will be central to our inquiry; the
interaction of the one-caring and the cared-for, and the effort by
the one-caring to maintain herself as one-caring without diminishing
her ethical ideal. We will need to consider as many factors as
possible in order to put ourselves, as nearly as possible, in the
position of the defendant.
An ethic of caring has far-reaching implications in that since we
will not have absolute principles to guide us in our attempt to meet
the other morally, everything depends upon the nature and strength
of the ideal.
Since we are dependent upon the strength and sensitivity of the
ethical ideal--both our own and that of others--we must nurture
that ideal in all of our educational encounters .... The primary
aim of all education must be nurturance of the ethical ideal.61

60. N. NODDINGS, supra note 8, at 115.
61. N. NODDINGS, supra note 8, at 6.
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I recognize that challenging our ethic of principles to some
extent calls into question the entire legal system. This in and of
itself will undoubtedly cause some to automatically reject the
challenge. I am reminded, however, that "[w]e are limited in our
thinking by too great a deference to what is, and what is today is
not very attractive. '6 2
With a legal system that incorporates an ethic of caring, we
might just move closer tQward achieving a kind of justice.
And then all that has divided us will merge
And then compassion will be wedded to power
And then softness will come to a world that is harsh and unkind
And then both men and women will be gentle
And then both women and men will be strong
And then no person will be subject to another's will
And then all will be rich and free and varied
And then the greed of some will give way to the needs of many
And then all will share equally in Earth's abundance
And then all will care for the sick and the weak and the old
And then all will nourish the young
And then all will cherish life's creatures
And then all will live in harmony with each other and the Earth
And then everywhere will be called Eden once again
Judy Chicago6

62. N.

NODDINGS,

supra note 8, at 180.

63. Chicago, Untitled Poemn in PEAcE: A
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223 (1986).

